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THE DAVIS CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
MARTIN B. MARGULIES*
I. INTRODUCTION
I have been asked to discuss the differences between the United
States Supreme Court during the Warren era and the Burger-
Rehnquist era. The differences can be encapsulated in a single
case: Washington v. Davis.'
In Davis, black applicants for the Washington, D.C. police force
challenged the District's civil service examination as racially dis-
criminatory.2 There was no allegation that the discrimination was
intentionalA The problem, rather, was that the examination em-
phasized various skills which the plaintiffs, victimized by inferior
schooling, had never had the opportunity to master.4 The inevita-
ble discriminatory consequence was that white candidates did rel-
atively well on the test, while black applicants performed poorly.5
With only two dissenting opinions,6 the Court rejected the chal-
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. Professor Margulies also has been
an active first amendment and state constitutional litigator, and has appeared, either as
direct counsel or as amicus curiae, in several of the cases that are cited in this article.
These cases include Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir.
1983), Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995), and State v.
Linares, 630 A.2d 1340 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). He has, in addition, argued numerous other
cases that present similar issues.
1 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2 426 U.S. at 232. The action was commenced by two black applicants who alleged that
the Washington D.C. Police Department's recruiting procedures discriminated on the basis
of race against black applicants by requiring, inter alia, written tests which excluded a
disproportionately high number of black applicants. Id. at 233. The plaintiffs asserted that
the recruiting practices were unlawfully discriminatory and thus violated the equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 234.
3 Id. at 235.
4 Id. at 249-50.
5 Id. at 234. Test 21 was an examination used throughout the federal service as part of a
17 week training program. Applicants were required to satisfy certain physical and charac-
ter standards, to have attained education equivalent to that of a high school graduate and
to earn at least a 50% on the test. Id. Test 21, developed by the Civil Service Commission,
measured verbal ability, vocabulary, reading and comprehension. Id. at 235.
6 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 259 (1976) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall, argued
that the plaintiffs ought to have prevailed on statutory grounds, and did not address the
constitutional question. Id. at 257.
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lenge.'7 Unintended racially discriminatory impacts, it declared, do
not trigger heightened scrutiny under either Fifth8 or Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection concepts.9
In the equal protection area alone, Davis has wielded tremen-
dous influence. During the two decades following the decision, the
Court has invoked Davis' discriminatory intent requirement to
turn back race discrimination challenges against exclusionary
zoning laws, 10 at-large voting systems,'1 and capital punish-
ment.' 2 The requirement has been extended to gender discrimina-
tion claims as well.' 3 It is now clear that before heightened scru-
tiny is applied to any equal protection-based attack upon a suspect
or quasi-suspect classification, the discriminatory intent threshold
must be satisfied.
Moreover, the Court has consistently equated "intent" with
"purpose": that is, in order to discriminate intentionally the gov-
ernment must have classified "because of," and not just "in spite
of," a known or anticipated discriminatory impact. 14 The Court re-
7 Davis, 426 U.S. at 246. The Court unequivocally stated: "The test is neutral on its face
and rationally may be said to serve a purpose the Government is constitutionally empow-
ered to pursue." Id.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The amendment states, in relevant part: "No person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The amendment states, in relevant part: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." Id.; see Davis, 426 U.S. at 246-48 (explaining that hiring or promotion
practices with racial impact merely require determination of whether practice is rationally
related to governmental purpose; such cases do not mandate "probing judicial review").
10 See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71
(1977) (relying on Davis in finding Village's re-zoning denial was motivated not by racial
discrimination but by desire to maintain Village's zoning plan).
11 See, e.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 68-70 (1980) (citing Davis in holding that
Mobile's at-large electoral system did not violate Fifteenth Amendment rights of city's
black voters).
12 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987)
(referring to Davis in concluding that administration of Georgia's capital punishment
clause did not violate Equal Protection Clause). Even where such challenges have suc-
ceeded, it was only because the Court found that intentional discrimination was present.
See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating state constitutional pro-
vision which disenfranchised certain classes of felons). The Court concluded that the fram-
ers had deliberately selected felonies committed principally by blacks. Id. at 232-33; Rog-
ers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627-28 (1982) (invalidating at-large voting system on basis of
discriminatory intent).
13 See, e.g., Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (finding oppo-
nent of Massachusetts' veterans' preference statute failed to demonstrate that law in any
way reflected purpose to discriminate on basis of gender).
14 See id. at 279. The Feeney court explained that "discriminatory purpose" implies more
than a mere awareness of the consequences, but rather that government has acted at least
in part "because of" the action's adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Id.; accord
Kemp, 481 U.S. at 298.
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jected pleas, from dissenting justices, to define "intent" as mean-
ing merely knowledge, or perhaps even foreseeability, of the dis-
criminatory effect. 1
5
Davis would be a landmark case even if its principles were con-
fined to equal protection issues. 16 Those principles have, however,
proved to be much broader.' 7 By allowing government decision-
makers to ignore known discriminatory consequences, Davis re-
ally teaches that the Court's only obligations, when dealing with
any "fundamental" constitutional right, are to remain strictly neu-
tral and to ensure that the political branches do the same.'" In
other words, neither the Justices nor elected officials have an af-
firmative constitutional duty to ameliorate private sector racial or
15 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that discriminatory
intent may be inferred from inevitable or foreseeable impact of statute). Interestingly, a
"knowledge" test would be more consistent with the usual meaning of "intent" in criminal
and tort law. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (stat-
ing that acting knowingly is ordinarily sufficient to establish intent); JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 10.04, at 105 (2d ed. 1995) (defining criminal intent as
acting with knowledge that social harm is virtually certain to result from one's conduct);
SANFORD A. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAw AND ITS PROCESSES 218-19
(6th ed. 1995); Grace Blumberg, De Facto and De Jure Sex Discrimination Under the Equal
Protection Clause: A Reconsideration of the Veteran's Preference in Public Employment, 26
BUFF. L. REV. 3, 36 (1977) (explaining that tort law definition of intent encompasses actor's
knowledge).
16 See Vada Berger et al., Comment, Too Much Justice: A Legislative Response to Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 437, 498 (1989) (referring to Davis as one of
landmark cases dealing with disparate impact under equal protection clause); Leslie A.
Coleman, Comment, It's the Thought That Counts: The Intent Requirement in Environmen-
tal Racism Claims, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 447, 459 (1993) (characterizing Davis as seminal
equal protection case); Barbara J. Flagg, 'Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Con-
sciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 961 (1993)
(stating that Davis represents first case in which Supreme Court set forth discriminatory
intent requirement for Equal Protection Clause).
17 See Judith 0. Brown et. al., The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in Constitu-
tional dissonance, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 573, 593-94 (1987). "Washington v. Davis assumes
existence of a nondiscriminatory society .... [tihus, a 'neutral' reason for a government
policy, notwithstanding its disproportionate racial impact, is sufficient to protect that pol-
icy from challenge." Id. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 955 (1989). "Washington v. Davis signaled a withdrawal from the
front lines of social change . . . explain[ing] that the alternatives to the discriminatory
intent standard 'would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and per-
haps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing
statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the
more affluent white."' Id.
18 See, e.g., Nathan Judish & Julia E. Judish, Falling Through the Cracks: Voting Rights
and the Census-City of New York v. United States Department of Commerce, 30 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 208 (1995). Davis indicates Supreme Court development of doctrine
that "facially race neutral governmental action will be strictly scrutinized only if it is dis-
criminatory in both impact an-1 purpose." Id. Furthermore, the Davis Court "rejected the
proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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economic disparities, no matter how severely these disparities in-
hibit the exercise of important freedoms."9
In this article, I shall show that Davis has had a devastating
(albeit largely unacknowledged) impact on First Amendment ju-
risprudence. I shall also argue that Davis' assertedly neutral pos-
ture is not nearly as "neutral" as it professes. Next, I shall con-
sider whether Davis has any legitimate part to play in
constitutional law, and if so, whether there is a principled way of
limiting the decision to where it belongs. Finally, I shall briefly
review the present Court's approach to Davis in both the equal
protection and First Amendment fields.
II. THE WARREN ERA
In contrast to the Burger-Rehnquist Court, the Warren Court
made no pretense of neutrality.2" Its members evidently believed
that the nation needed radical racial, economic and social reform.
Believing that the political process was too skewed to provide such
reform, the Justices opted to provide their own.2"
Brown v. Board of Education22 was the most obvious example of
Court-initiated reform. But by modern standards, there was noth-
ing exceptional about Brown, because it involved a race classifica-
tion that was both purposeful and facial. 23 More dramatic, there-
fore, was the 1966 ruling in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections.24 There, the Court invalidated a modest and facially
19 See, e.g., Rebecca Marcus, Racism in our Courts: The Underfunding of Public Defend-
ers and its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219,
242-45 (1994) (describing heavy criticism of Davis' "discriminatory purpose" doctrine by
legal scholars who believe standard fails to take adequate account of pervasive American
racism).
20 See Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Govern-
ment: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 83, 101. "It is an
accepted tenet of the American legal establishment that the Warren Court engaged in judi-
cial activism to achieve social goals." Id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Con-
stitution, 103 HARv. L. REV. 43, 45, 46 (1989). "The Rehnquist Court's judicial philosophy
obviously differs from... the Warren Court, which saw its role as safeguarding fundamen-
tal rights and racial minorities." Id. at 45.
21 See Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 28 IND. L.
REV. 309, 309 (1995) (noting that Warren Court has traditionally been viewed as commit-
ted to social goals, including efficiency, humanitarianism, equality of economic opportunity,
and equal treatment before law).
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. At issue in Brown were several state statutes which permit-
ted or required segregation of white and black children in the public schools of a State
solely on the basis of race. Id. at 486-88 n.1. The Court found that such segregation de-
prived the minority children of equal educational opportunities. Id. at 493.
24 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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neutral poll tax which had a disparate effect on racial minorities
and on the poor.25 Harper's dicta clearly stated that poverty, like
race, was a suspect basis for classification,26 and that poor people
were protected against purposeful discrimination as well as
against unintended disparate impacts arising from facially even-
handed state action.
Some of the Warren Court's most revolutionary decisions came
in areas which, at first glance, seemed far removed from issues of
race and wealth: for instance, criminal procedure and speech.
The criminal procedure decisions had an implicit equal protection
component, because their aim was to provide impoverished crimi-
nal suspects, many of whom were black, with the same procedural
safeguards that middle class whites had always taken for
granted.28 The speech decisions also had an implicit equal protec-
tion component, for their aim was to level the playing field so that
racial minorities and the poor might use the political process more
effectively.29 In both sets of decisions, the Justices seemed moti-
vated by a wish to inspire America's "have-nots" with respect for
law and confidence in the political order. Thus, controversial rul-
ings such as Miranda v. Arizona,8" Escobedo v. Illinois,31 Gideon
25 Harper, 383 U.S. at 666. Under Virginia's constitution, payment of poll taxes was a
pre-condition for voting. Id. at 664 n.1. The tax was limited to $1.50 per year, to be used
mainly to aid public schools with the remainder to be returned to the counties for general
purposes. Id. The Court concluded that "a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee
an electoral standard." Id. at 666. In support of its holding, the Court explained that
wealth, like race, is not relevant to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral
process. Id. at 668.
26 Id. at 668.
27 383 U.S. at 668.
28 Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical
Tools of the Sixties, 67 TuL. L. REV. 2231, 2245 (1993) (describing Warren Court's "criminal
procedure reform" as constituting branch of race law, and asserting that famous criminal
procedure cases implicated relations between "Anglo controlled police and people of color in
urban settings"); Gary Stein, Expanding the Due Process Rights of Indigent Litigants: Will
Texaco Trickle Down?, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 463, 472 (1986) (recognizing Warren Court's effort
to develop heightened measure of equal protection for discrimination against poverty-
stricken).
29 See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT N AMERICAN POLITICS 89
(3d ed. 1993) (noting that majority of Warren Court's decisions favored protecting individu-
als and minorities against government).
30 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding self-incriminating statements acquired through in-cus-
tody interrogation of criminal suspects were inadmissible unless suspects were first
warned of their rights to silence and free counsel).
31 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding right to counsel attaches from moment of arrest, and that
any self-incriminating statement elicited from uncounseled suspect who has requested and
been denied counsel is inadmissible).
44 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:39
v. Wainwright32 and Mapp v. Ohio33 did not merely aim to make
the criminal process more fair. They aimed at that, to be sure-
but the objective was also far more ambitious. Implicit in all of
these decisions was the perception that victims of police over-
reaching tended, more often than not, to be poor, black, or both. 4
Therefore, it was necessary to curb the overreaching, not only in
order to achieve justice, but in order to give America's under-
classes a sense that this was their country too.
Similarly, the Warren Court's first amendment jurisprudence
did not seek just to expand speech opportunities for their own
sake. Rather, the Court sought to expand such opportunities in
the interest of people-many of them poor, black or both-who
lacked access to the mass media that were coming to dominate the
so-called marketplace of ideas.35 The Court pursued this objective
in three principal ways.
First, the Court vastly expanded speakers' access to traditional
public fora such as streets, sidewalks, parks, and the grounds sur-
rounding state capitols. It did so primarily by curbing the discre-
tion of state and local officials to deny speaking permits, or to
arrest demonstrators who provoked hostile audience responses or
created other sorts of public disturbances. Significantly, the lead-
ing decisions on the subject -Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,3 6
Gregory v. Chicago,37 Cox v. Louisiana ("Cox I'),38 and Edwards v.
South Carolina39-all arose in the context of civil rights
demonstrations.4 0
32 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that states, like federal government, must appoint free
counsel for indigent criminal suspects).
33 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment is
inadmissible in state as well as federal criminal proceedings).
34 See Hon. Louis H. Pollack, The Limitless Horizons of Brown v. Board of Education, 61
FoRDHAM L. REV. 19, 20 (1992) (stating that Warren court recognized in many ways that
most frequent users of American criminal process are poor and deprived-mainly Black
Americans).
35 See generally Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and
the Subordination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 95, 123 (asserting that First Amendment
decisions of Warren Court were important because Court authoritatively asserted that
Black people were citizens whose voices deserved to be heard).
36 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
37 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
38 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
39 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
40 Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 159 (invalidating city ordinance which proscribed partici-
pating in any parade or procession on city streets or public ways without first obtaining
permit from City Commission). The Shuttlesworth case involved an orderly civil rights
march by 52 blacks in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963. Id. at 148-49; see also Gregory, 394
U.S. at 112 (finding arrest and conviction for disorderly conduct of peaceful civil rights
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Second, the Court also expanded access to what would today be
called non-traditional government fora. In perhaps its most im-
portant and ambitious speech decision-Brown v. Louisiana4 -a
three-member plurality held that protesters were entitled to con-
duct a non-disruptive silent sit-in at a public library when the
purpose was to protest racial segregation at the library itself.42
Lower courts seized upon this ruling to declare that all sorts of
government facilities became "public fora" whenever the speech
bore some special relationship to the premises, either symboli-
cally, or because the property was likely to contain the speaker's
desired audience.43
Third, the Court also granted speakers access to private prop-
erty, in the form of large, privately-owned shopping centers. The
Court's decision in Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley
Plaza44 used the dubious logic of the "state action" doctrine to de-
clare that these centers resembled municipal downtowns, and
were therefore state actors by virtue of exercising a delegated sov-
ereign function. Nobody reading the opinion, however, should be
taken in. The Court did not really mean that shopping center
owners somehow functioned as government agents. Rather, the
demonstrators who failed to disperse on orders of Chicago police violated due process); Cox,
379 U.S. at 558 (holding that arrest and conviction of civil rights demonstration leader in
close proximity to courthouse constituted denial of equal protection by suppressing free
expression); Edwards, 372 U.S. at 238 (concluding that arrest and conviction of demonstra-
tors who protested discriminatory actions against blacks in South Carolina was infringe-
ment of their rights of free speech, free assembly and freedom to petition for redress of
grievances).
41 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
42 Id. at 143.
43 Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1983). I ar-
gued for plaintiffs on behalf of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation in that
case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the State of
Connecticut had to allow marchers to use an abandoned strip of railway property, inter-
secting Highway 84, in order to publicize their view that it was environmentally sounder to
revive rail transportation than to expand that very highway. Id.; New York City Unem-
ployed Welfare Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding welfare office
had to allow welfare rights activists to pass out literature in its waiting rooms); Wolin v.
Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). In
Wolin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a bus terminal
had to accommodate anti-war demonstrators who wished to address soldiers embarking
from the terminal en route to a training camp and added, in dicta, that police were obliged
to protect the demonstrators in the event of a hostile audience reaction. Id. at 94.
44 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Logan Valley built upon a much earlier decision granting speak-
ers access to the public streets of wholly-owned company towns. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, the state action rationale was more convincing, because the
property owner in that case was indeed exercising a power traditionally associated with
sovereignty. Id. at 502-03. Only governments, historically, have operated cities and towns.
Seldom if ever, in western nations, have governments peddled consumer goods.
46 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
Court was saying in substance what its plurality had said in
Brown: the property was a "public forum" because the speakers
could find their desired audience there as nowhere else; because
they lacked the means to communicate effectively in any other
place or manner; and because the property owner would suffer lit-
tle or no injury from the speech activity."5
The Court cast these decisions in disarmingly modest terms.
They were rationalized as classic negative prohibitions: state and
local governments could not exclude demonstrators from streets or
public libraries, or use their police power to enforce a shopping
center's no-solicitation policy against public speakers.
But there is no mistaking the decisions' true import. In Shut-
tlesworth, Gregory, Cox, Edwards, and Brown, the Court was, in
essence, requiring government officials to make public property
available to impecunious speakers who lacked property of their
own with which to communicate. This was no mere negative pro-
hibition; on the contrary, these cases imposed an affirmative duty
on government to provide a speech subsidy. In Logan Valley, the
Court went even further: it required wealthy and powerful pri-
vate parties to provide the speech subsidy directly,46 and in-
structed the police to side with the speakers if the private parties
refused to comply.47
Thus, the Warren Court's speech decisions followed the same
pattern as the criminal procedure decisions. 48 In all of these in-
stances the Court set out to reform and transform what it per-
ceived as a badly skewed society. The only difference was that in
the criminal procedure cases, the Court instituted the reforms di-
rectly, while in the speech cases, the Court pursued its objective
more circuitously. By helping the poor to participate more effec-
tively in the political process, it enabled them to seek the neces-
sary reforms themselves.
III. THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT
It is neither my purpose, nor within my competence, to trace in
detail the impact of the Burger-Rehnquist Court on constitutional
45 391 U.S. at 323.
46 391 U.S. at 324-25.
47 391 U.S. at 319-20.
48 They also reflected the pattern established in the Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) decisions.
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criminal procedure. Suffice it to say that the Warren-era revolu-
tion has been halted and, in some instances, rolled back. For in-
stance, though suspects must still be advised of their rights to si-
lence and to counsel prior to custodial interrogation, admissions
obtained in violation of this requirement may now be used for im-
peachment purposes.4 9 Additionally, even though illegally seized
evidence remains generally inadmissible, there is a good faith ex-
ception when police obtain the evidence in reasonable reliance
upon an invalid warrant.50 I shall not discuss whether these deci-
sions are sound, other than to observe that the modern Court-
unlike Earl Warren's-seems untroubled by the likelihood that
impoverished and uneducated defendants will be disproportion-
ately affected.
Instead, I shall focus on the Burger-Rehnquist Court's first
amendment jurisprudence in the field which deals with speakers'
rights of access to public and private premises: the field of forum-
analysis. For here, I believe, is where Davis has cast its longest
and most malign shadow.
A. The Leading Speech Decisions
Ironically, the Davis principle, insofar as it applies to speech,
traces its roots to the Warren Court, which sometimes wavered in
its treatment of speech issues. There are at least two important
exceptions to that Court's pattern of expanding poor people's
speech opportunities. In Adderley v. Florida,5 1 a bare-bones ma-
jority held that demonstrators were not entitled to assemble on
the curtilage of a county jail, even when the purpose of the demon-
49 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). Chief Justice Burger urged that "Ithe
shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a
defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances." Id.; Richard
K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confes-
sions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 799 (1988) (arguing that in Harris, Chief Justice Burger was
not concerned with institutional fairness or individual rights but only with "the true value
of the illegal confession" to be used at trial).
50 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). The Court noted that "[sluppression
. remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was
misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known
was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth." Id. at 923; see Donald Dripps,
Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 907 (1986) (agreeing with result of Leon, but arguing
that Leon does less to effect exception to exclusionary rule than to substitute procedural for
substantive definition of probable cause).
51 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
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stration was to protest racial segregation at that jail.52 Likewise,
in United States v. O'Brien53 , the Court, with just one dissent, ap-
plied a fairly relaxed standard of scrutiny to what it termed a con-
tent-neutral rule which governed the non-expressive component of
So-called symbolic, i.e. non-verbal, speech.54
Adderley and O'Brien, however, are easily distinguishable from
vintage Warren-era speech decisions. Had the Warren Court's
majority survived into the 1970s and 1980s, I suspect that it
would have distinguished both rulings and thereby confined them.
The jail in Adderley differed from the library in Brown, and from
the state house grounds in Edwards, in that jails are tightly-con-
trolled facilities which are not generally open to the public. This
single detail would have sufficed to limit Adderley to its facts.5 5 As
for O'Brien, the federal statute at issue was passed during the
Vietnam War to forbid the mutilation of draft cards. 56 The Court
could have explained its deferential posture as reflecting its tradi-
tional acknowledgment of expansive national war powers.5 7
It fell, however, to Warren Burger, William Rehnquist and their
colleagues, not to Earl Warren and his, to interpret these rulings.
In their hands, Adderley and O'Brien received broad applications
and Davis implicitly guided the applications.
52 Id. at 46-48. The Court reasoned that "[tihe United States Constitution does not forbid
a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful non-discriminatory pur-
pose." Id. at 48; cf Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965) (reversing convictions
grounded in breach of peace, obstructing of public passages, and picketing near passages in
connection with public demonstration against racial segregation); Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1963) (reversing breach of peace conviction in connection with
demonstration at State capitol against racial segregation since "breach of peace" allegation
was so overly broad as to endanger First Amendment rights of demonstrators).
53 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
54 Id. at 376. The Court formulated a four part test for determining when a sufficiently
important governmental interest exists, so as to allow regulation of expressive conduct:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the Constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental in-
terest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
55 See Adderley, 385 U.S. at 41 (stating that traditionally, State capitol grounds are open
to public but jails are not).
56 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 380.
57 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70-71, 82-83 (1981) (applying unusually deferen-
tial variety of nominally intermediate scrutiny to Act of Congress requiring only males to
register for possible conscription); cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24
(1944) (applying unusually deferential variety of nominally strict scrutiny to military order
excluding Japanese-Americans from West Coast areas during Word War II).
1995] THE DAVIS CASE 49
First, in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n,8 the
Burger Court, citing Adderley, constructed a new, categorical ap-
proach to forum-analysis which differentiated sharply between
public and non-public forum property.59 Later cases make it clear
that only "traditional" public fora are open, as of right, to speech
activity, and that the only "traditional" public fora are municipal
and suburban streets, sidewalks and parks, and the grounds of
seats of government such as state capitols. On all other property,
the government is free to exclude or regulate speakers virtually at
will, as long as it does not overtly discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint.6" In particular, these later cases lay to rest Brown's
bold proposition that "public fora" exist wherever speakers can
find their desired audiences. Government agencies, therefore, no
longer have to accommodate non-disruptive speech which bears a
special relationship to the premises if the property may lawfully
be closed to unrelated expression. 61
Second, even in traditional public fora, the Burger-Rehnquist
Court, building upon O'Brien, has applied a nominally intermedi-
ate but, in practice, rather relaxed review to content-neutral
speech regulations. Here, the Court has melded two formerly dis-
tinct but similar lines of analysis: the O'Brien analysis, which it
58 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
59 Id. at 46. The Perry Court established three categories todistinguish public and non-
public forum property. Id. at 46-47.
60 See, e.g., Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2446 (1995)
(concluding State Capital grounds are traditional public fora); International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2706-07 (1992) (asserting that insides
of airport terminals are non-public fora); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727-28
(1990) (holding that post office sidewalks, if separated from municipal ones, are non-public
fora); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (reasoning that suburban residential
streets are traditional public fora); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 804-06 (1985) (holding that government-sponsored fund drive is non-public forum). I
shall not discuss here the peculiar creature known as the "designated" forum. See Perry,
460 U.S. at 45-46. A designated forum is a non-forum which the government voluntarily
opens to speech activity. I shall merely observe that this forum exists at the whim of the
government, and is functionally indistinguishable from a non-forum. See Lee, 112 S. Ct. at
2717 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
I should mention, finally, that the Burger Court, in its early years, appeared to embrace
a forum-theory similar and perhaps even identical to the Warren Court's: it declared that
all government properties, physically suitable for speech, were public fora unless the gov-
ernment could show in particular instances that the proposed manner of speech was incom-
patible with the property's normal use. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119
(1972). But Perry, though it does not formally repudiate Grayned, in fact stands it on its
head: all government property is henceforth presumed incompatible with speech unless the
property is a traditional public forum.
61 The Second Circuit has gotten the message. It recently questioned whether its older
cases, involving special relationships between speech and the premises, were still valid,
and strongly intimated a negative answer. Lee, 925 F.2d at 579.
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used for statutes that govern the non-expressive components of
non-verbal speech activity;62 and the analysis it used for regula-
tions which directly control the time, place and manner of either
verbal or non-verbal speech.63 The common denominator in both
analyses was that the government interest which supports the
regulations does not depend upon the substance of the expression.
Hence, the analyses are now interchangeable. 64 Applying one
analysis or the other, but in either event using the same relaxed
standard of review, the Court has deferred to purely speculative
concerns of government decision-makers, 65 sustained underinclu-
sive and overinclusive regulations,66 and refused to weigh the as-
serted governmental interests. 67 In addition, the Court has inti-
mated-and lower courts have agreed-that persons speaking in
a traditional public forum may be assessed reasonable fees for the
costs of police protection as long as the assessments are grounded.
in content-neutral criteria.68 The Court has also intimated-and
62 O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding statute that prohibited burn-
ing of draft cards).
63 Heffiron, 452 U.S. at 654 (concluding that Minnesota state fair rule requiring that all
enterprises sell or distribute materials from fixed location did not violate First Amendment
rights of Krishna Society).
64 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1984) (sus-
taining Park Service regulation that prohibited camping in certain parks). To put it differ-
ently, when the government regulates the non-expressive component of symbolic expres-
sion (by saying, for instance, that one may not burn a draft card), the government is really
regulating the manner of expression; it is telling us, in other words, that we may convey
our opposition to conscription, or to war, in a number of ways, but not by mutilating our
registration certificate.
65 Heffron, 452 U.S. at 653 (sustaining fairgrounds rule, confining solicitors of funds to
booths, based on purely speculative fear that allowing solicitors to approach fairground
patrons outside booths would cause congestion or other problems).
66 See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805-07 (1984) (sus-
taining regulation banning posting of unattended signs on municipal property based on
municipality's asserted aesthetic interests, even though municipality had taken no action
against other, non-expressive visual pollutants); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 802 (1989) (sustaining sound regulation, of rock music in New York City's Central
Park, without requiring City to pursue less speech-restrictive means of sound control).
67 See, e.g., Vincent, 466 U.S. at 816-17 (accepting City's position that aesthetic interest
in avoiding visual clutter justifies removal of signs creating or increasing such clutter);
Clark, 468 U.S. at 299 (deferring to Park Service's ban on overnight sleeping in certain
Washington, D.C. parks, even though ban was only supported by administrative conven-
ience concerns). A more recent ruling, Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct.
2445 (1994), suggests that the time, place and manner standard is acquiring some teeth,
but it is still not nearly as rigorous as the standard which governs content-based regula-
tions. Id. at 2469-70. The Turner Court held that a government regulation must promote "a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regula-
tion." Id. at 2469.
68 Forsyth Co. v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 (1992) (holding that fees
levied on organizations in connection with parades or demonstrations were unconstitu-
tional); Gay and Lesbian Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 832 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mo.), as modified
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
agreed, despite its earlier statement to the contrary-that police
have no obligation to protect such persons at all, even against hos-
tile audiences, unless the refusal is based on invidious factors
such as the speaker's race or police hostility to the views
expressed.69
Third, the Burger Court initially distinguished the Logan Valley
decision,70 and confined it to its facts, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,7 '
and then overruled Logan Valley altogether in Hudgens v.
NLRB. 72 As a result, no speaker today may assert a First Amend-
ment right to use someone else's private property for speech pur-
poses. This is so even when the property is generally open to the
public and attracts the same sorts of large and diverse audiences
that thronged America's downtown shopping areas before pri-
vately-owned shopping centers came into being.73
841 F. Supp. 295, 296 (1993) (holding that parade permit fees assessed in order to cover
projected police expenses constituted a reasonable time, place and manner restriction);
Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride v. Long Beach, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 861, 874 (2 Dep't Super.
Ct. 1993). The latter court concluded that parade permit fees were valid time, place and
manner regulations. Id. The court went on to say that "there is no content based deficiency
in a permit scheme that requires the permittee to pay costs of traffic control while inciden-
tally providing built in public safety protection." Id.
69 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Soc. Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (stating that
Fourteenth Amendment does not impose affirmative obligations on government, and hence
social service agency is not constitutionally liable for failing to protect child abuse victim);
Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993). The Dwares Court interpreted
DeShaney to hold that "an allegation simply that police officers had failed to act upon re-
ports of past violence would not implicate the victim's rights under the Due Process
Clause." Id. However, a due process violation would arise if police officers "had assisted in
creating or increasing the danger to the victim." Id. But see Wolin v. Port of New York
Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1988) (reasoning that plaintiff was entitled to protection by
Port Authority police in his exercise of speech rights).
70 Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
319 (1968) (holding members of public may not be excluded from exercising First Amend-
ment rights at privately owned shopping center, because it was "community" business
block).
71 407 U.S. 551, 564 (1972) (distinguishing Logan Valley on basis that handbilling in
present case was unrelated to any activity at defendant's shopping center and plaintiffs
had adequate alternate means of communication). The distinction was purportedly based
on the fact that in Logan Valley, the expression-labor picketing-was related to the prem-
ises. Id.
72 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (stating that Logan Valley rationale did not survive Lloyd
case).
73 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (stating if shopping center is "func-
tional equivalent of a municipality" then content based speech restrictions would be imper-
missible); John A. Ragosta, Free Speech Access to Shopping Malls Under State Constitu-
tions, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 40 (1986) (noting that after Hudgens, no First Amendment
protection exists in private shopping centers).
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B. The Relationship Between Davis and Speech
Perry and its progeny, O'Brien and its progeny and Hudgens all
owe a doctrinal debt to Davis."4 In order to appreciate Davis' im-
pact, one must examine how the Burger-Rehnquist Court's speech
jurisprudence operates, first in theory, and then in practice.
In theory, the guiding principle is one of strict neutrality. Well-
to-do and poor people alike may use their own property to dissemi-
nate messages.7 5 They may also use government property, pro-
vided that the property is a traditional public forum such as a mu-
nicipal or suburban street, sidewalk or park, or the grounds of a
seat of government such as a state capitol."6 The government,
however, may control the time, place and manner of their expres-
sion through even-handed regulations. 77 Neither the affluent nor
the indigent are entitled to disseminate messages in non-tradi-
tional government fora, or on other people's private property."8
The practice, however, is dramatically different. Poor people,
many of whom belong to racial minorities, often do not own prop-
erty. Most certainly, they do not own newspapers, radio or televi-
sion stations, or shopping centers. 79 Thus, they have no effective
mechanisms of their own for communicating to society at large."0
74 Though Hudgens was released slighity before Davis, it was decided the same year.
Hence I think it fair to include it as part of Davis' legacy, or at any rate as inspired by the
same principle.
75 See, e.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (noting that newspa-
pers cannot constitutionally be compelled to provide forum to others); City of Ladue v. Gil-
leo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2047 (1994) (holding that City ordinance which forbade residents from
posting signs at their private residences violated their First Amendment rights).
76 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (setting out
three categories of public forums); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1968).
The Shuttlesworth Court stated that streets and parks have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public. Id. Such use of the streets and public places has, from an-
cient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens. Id.
(quoting Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)).
77 See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (stating that time, place and
manner regulation of speech must apply to all speech, without regard to content); Tinker v.
Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1967) (forbidding regulation against wearing
black arm bands in schools as restriction on content).
78 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-25, at 999 (2d
ed. 1988) (noting constitutional toleration of private property owner's rights to exclude un-
wanted views); Ragosta, supra note 73 passim (detailing public and private forum analysis
of free speech in shopping centers).
79 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Silence on the Street Corner, 26 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1, 1
(1992) (noting that most radicals do not have sufficient funds to buy air time).
80 See generally Thomas Kelven, Free Speech and the Struggle for Power, 9 N.Y.L. ScH.
J. Hum. RTS. 315 (1992) (noting that political and social stratification are facilitated by
access to powerful communications mechanisms).
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Although they do have access to traditional public fora, that ac-
cess is of little practical use to them today for three reasons.
The first reason is that well-documented population shifts, from
the cities to the suburbs, have emptied the traditional public fo-
rum of its former audiences, forcing the speaker to follow the pub-
lic to airport terminals, suburban post offices, and suburban shop-
ping malls.81 Under the Burger-Rehnquist Court's speech
jurisprudence, however, these places are off limits to expressive
activity, because they are either non-public government fora or
private fora. In consequence, as Justice Kennedy and two of his
colleagues recently observed, "our forum doctrine retains no rele-
vance in times of fast-changing technology and increasing insular-
ity, in a country where most citizens travel by automobile, and
parks all too often become locales for crime rather than social in-
tercourse .... 2
The second reason flows from the first. Since traditional public
fora no longer provide direct access to large audiences, there is
only one way that speakers who utilize these fora can obtain such
access. That one way is by attracting media attention through
dramatic devices: for instance, the public burning of a selective
service registration certificate. 3 O'Brien and its progeny, how-
ever, allow the government to prohibit such measures as long as
government officials can conjure up a plausible and content-neu-
tral justification for doing so."
The third reason why access to public fora is of little use to
speakers with limited financial resources also orginates with
O'Brien. Later decisions, based on O'Brien, suggest that the gov-
ernment may make the use of traditional public fora prohibitively
risky, or expensive, either by withholding police protection alto-
81 Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 324 (1968) (noting advent of shopping centers as population moves from cities to
suburbs).
82 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2717
(1992) (Kennedy, Blackmun and Souter, JJ., concurnng). Interestingly, even though Jus-
tices Kennedy and Souter were appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush, respectively,
their forum-analysis has closely resembled the Warren Court's approach.
83 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968) (sustaining judgment against indi-
vidual who publicly burned Selective Service registration certificate).
84 See id. at 377 (justifying governmental regulation if it furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest); see also United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318
(1990) (holding that Texas anti-flag burning statute, because content based, did not survive
strict scrutiny analysis); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (holding that Texas
anti-flagburning statute did not survive strict scrutiny analysis).
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gether, or by charging for it, provided once again that the govern-
ment's actions are even-handed. 5 Under these decisions, persons
who lack resources to provide their own security, or to pay police,
may find it dangerous or financially impossible to speak publicly
at all.
For all of these reasons, the Burger-Rehnquist Court's speech
jurisprudence discriminates in practice against the speech of the
poor.8 6 By doing so, moreover, it also discriminates against the
anti-establishment views that poor people, many of whom belong
to racial minorities, are likely to utter. To be sure, rich and poor
people alike have the indefeasible right to use their own property,
or public forum property, in order to challenge the existing polit-
ical, economic and social structure. With the exception of a few
idiosyncratic declassees, however, rich people will not do so. The
result is de facto viewpoint discrimination: speakers with a stake
in the status quo have ample expressive opportunities, while
speakers who wish to attack the status quo have few or none.87
These latter speakers' only recourse is to speak out in some empty
downtown street."" The First Amendment serves, for them,
merely a cathartic, not a truly communicative, function. 9
Here, however, is where Davis comes into play. The conse-
quences that I have described do not arise from intentional gov-
ernment action as that term is presently defined. True, govern-
ment officials are perhaps aware of these consequences when they
place post offices or airport terminals off-limits to speech activity.
At the very least they ought to foresee such consequences. There is
no reason to suppose, however, that they act for the purpose of
suppressing disfavored ideas.90 Therefore, these known or fore-
seeable consequences do not give rise to a First Amendment viola-
85 See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1992) (holding
ordinance allowing permit fee was invalid because content based); DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (noting that language of Due Process
Clause does not require States to protect its citizens from infringement upon liberty by
private persons).
86 See generally RUSSELL GALLOWAY, THE RICH AND THE POOR IN SuPREME COURT His-
TORY 179. 185 (1982) (concluding that Supreme Court traditionally bases decisions upon
socio-economic values tending to favor rich parties over poor).
87 See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). "If there is a bedrock princi-
ple underlying the First Amendment, it is that government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Id.
88 Fiss, supra note 79, at 3 (noting that street corner is now "last, desperate forum").
89 Id.
90 See, e.g. Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977) (noting
that in order to succeed against former employer for wrongful discharge based upon consti-
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tion. They are, instead, constitutionally irrelevant discriminatory
effects. Thus, Davis has subtly guided the Burger-Rehnquist
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence, even though the decision
itself is rarely cited in the pertinent cases.91
IV. DAvzs. A TRULY NEUTRAL PRINCIPLE?
The Burger-Rehnquist Court has prided itself on its neutrality
and Davis is its crowning achievement. Reduced to its essentials,
Davis postulates that the Justices have no business thrusting
their vision of social justice upon the nation. Rather, their only
function is to ensure that government does not load the scales by
purposely discriminating on the basis of invidious factors such as
race, gender or speakers' points of view.92
Davis, however, is not as neutral as it professes to be. In the
first place, it serves to perpetuate the status quo, for it mutes both
the voices of the poor and the dissident viewpoints which poor peo-
ple may wish to express. Moreover, it tacitly reflects, and thrusts
upon the nation, a social vision of its own. That social vision is
quite different from the Warren Court's, but it is nevertheless a
social vision. Earl Warren and his colleagues believed that society
was too badly skewed for theoretical equality to produce even
roughly equal results.9 3 Accordingly, in their view, it behooved the
judiciary to examine, and seek to rectify, society's wealth and
power disparities. Most members of the present Court appear to
believe, in contrast, that society is not as skewed as their prede-
cessors had supposed. They believe, in other words, that if civil
service examiners treat all applicants the same, blacks and other
ethnic minorities will get their fair share of jobs if only they try
tutionally protected conduct one must show such conduct was motivating factor in em-
ployer's decision).
91 At least one First Amendment decision does cite Davis. Employment Div. Or. Dep't of
Hum. Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). The Court held that facially neutral
criminal statutes do not violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause merely be-
cause they incidentally burden a religious practice. Id. The Court was unimpressed by the
fact that-since more powerful sects usually have sufficient clout to defeat such statutes, or
to procure statutory exemptions-the only practices likely to be burdened in this manner
are those of religious minorities. Id. Though Smith was a free exercise case, not a speech
one, the message is the same: unintended disparate impacts do not matter.
92 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
93 See ARNOLD S. RICE, THE SuPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE WARREN COURT
1953-1969 213 (1987). The Court stated that Chief Justice Warren possessed "an uncom-
mon degree of common sense about what was just and proper in society in general and in
the law in particular .... The Warren Court was by far the most activist, law-changing
Court in the history of the nation." Id.
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hard enough; that if elected and appointed officials treat all speak-
ers the same, impecunious speakers-including blacks and other
ethnic minorities-will be able to influence the political process as
effectively as anyone else, although they may have to expend some
additional effort in order to do so.
Perhaps the present-day Justices are making a different point.
Perhaps they are saying, instead, that critical private sector
wealth and power imbalances may indeed exist, but that judges
lack institutional competence to identify them, because to do so
would require the courts to make forbidden political and social
value judgments.94 This too, however, implicitly conceals precisely
such a value judgment, for it postulates that the disparities are
not self-evident enough for courts to take judicial notice of them.
From the likes of Earl Warren, William Douglas, Abe Fortas, Ar-
thur Goldberg and William Douglas, the modern Court's reticence
(or, as they might have put it, blindness) would have provoked a
sneer and a chortle.
If anything, private sector wealth and power disparities are
even more pronounced today than in Earl Warren's time.95 In the
face of these disparities, Davis and kindred decisions comprise,
collectively, a jurisprudence of denial.
V. IN PARTIAL DEFENSE OF DAVIS
I have treated Davis harshly. I must acknowledge, however,
that it nevertheless has its place. As a purely equal protection
decision, Davis makes sense. If known or foreseeable disparate
racial impacts triggered strict scrutiny's virtually automatic death
sentence-if state and local governments, in consequence, had an
affirmative constitutional obligation to rectify such impacts-then
federal judges would run the country. In a racially stratified soci-
ety, virtually all laws have racially disparate impacts. As Davis
itself observed, abandoning the discriminatory intent requirement
or equating intent with knowledge or foreseeability of conse-
94 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 90-91 (1978) (holding there is no
principled basis for identifying historically disadvantaged minorities); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that "social and economic" legislation must be
subject to same rational basis review regardless of whether it implicates economic rights of
businesses or economic rights of welfare recipients, because there is no principled basis for
distinguishing between them).
95 See Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to
the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 37 (1987).
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quences "would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invali-
date, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and
to the average black than to the more affluent white."96 The price,
in loss of representative self-government at the state and local
levels, would simply be too high.9 7
Nor do I argue that government has an affirmative constitu-
tional duty to ameliorate poverty by providing subsistence bene-
fits, either for their own sake or as a means of enabling poor peo-
ple to speak out more effectively.9 Experts and the general public
alike disagree bitterly over whether welfare and kindred entitle-
ments truly ameliorate poverty, or whether they instead exacer-
bate and perpetuate it by destroying individual initiative.9 9 In the
face of such widespread disagreement, which no empirical evi-
dence can resolve, federal courts have no principled choice but to
leave welfare decisions to the political process. 100
Finally, I do not mean to denigrate, or dismiss as altogether fu-
tile, Davis' search for neutral principles. I do not believe that con-
stitutional law is an oxymoron, or that it inevitably functions as
politics in disguise. Though perfect neutrality is unattainable, the
quest for it is still worthwhile; by very dint of pursuing it, we inch
closer to the goal. I merely urge that the pursuers keep their eyes
open to neutrality's inevitable failings.
Forum-analysis, however, is special. As Professor Harry Kalven
explained, its very purpose is to provide speech opportunities to
"those with little access to the more genteel means of communica-
tion": in other words, to the poor. 10 1 Hence the doctrine functions
as a unique constitutionally mandated affirmative duty-a duty to
subsidize poor people's speech by providing impecunious speakers
96 Davis, 426 U.S. at 229, 248.
97 See TRME supra note 78, at 1513 n.94. On the other hand, it might make sense to
adopt a knowledge or foreseeabiity standard for at least some discriminatory impacts
under state constitutions, where federalism concerns are by definition absent.
98 See Edelman, supra note 95, at 37-40 (advocating use of constitutionally guaranteed
welfare rights as mechanism for enhancing speech opportunities for indigents).
99 Id. at 15-16 (noting welfare may increase poverty or, alternatively, create depen-
dency); cf Ralph K Winter, Changing Concepts of Equality: From Equality Before the Law
to the Welfare State, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 741, 753-54 (asserting that there is no benefit to
equal distribution of material wealth).
100 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). "[Tlhe intractable economic,
social and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs
are not the business of this Court." Id.
101 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT.
REV. 1, 30.
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with suitable locations for communicating to large audiences. By
definition, therefore, the doctrine requires courts to consider eco-
nomic and similar impacts.
It is no great stretch to recognize that the economic impacts of
the United States Supreme Court's forum decisions will vary from
one generation to the next. Thus, guaranteed access to the na-
tion's streets, sidewalks and parks may have sufficed, forty or fifty
years ago, to offset many of the disadvantages that poor people
faced when attempting to disseminate their views. Today, "in
times of fast-changing technology and increasing insularity,"" 2 it
suffices no longer. The Court, accordingly, should provide the poor
with other speech locations. It should do so, moreover, regardless
of whether those other locations are publicly or privately owned,
for ultimately the public must pay for the subsidy in either event.
If the property consists of a government office building or parking
lot, the costs will be assessed in slightly higher taxes; if it consists
of a shopping center, the costs will be assessed in slightly higher
prices for consumer goods.' 013 The First Amendment, of course,
does not prevent the property owner-governmental or private-
from imposing reasonable regulations in order to minimize those
costs, but the subsidy should include, at the very least, police pro-
tection on the property for unpopular speakers. Otherwise, access
would be too risky to be worthwhile.
Expanding access to forums, on behalf of the poor, is actually
consistent with Davis' objectives in at least two ways. First, Davis
expressly sought to strengthen the political process, by leaving the
remediation of most disparate impacts to that process. 104 Judicial
creation of a more generous public forum doctrine would admit-
tedly thwart the .process in the short run, for it would override the
will of political decision-makers who try to exclude speakers from
public property in the name of aesthetics, economy or administra-
102 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2717
(1992) (Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens & Souter, JJ., concurring).
103 In the case of shopping centers, the state action which the First and Fourteenth
Amendments require should be found, not in the attenuated logic of the public function
doctrine, but rather in the present use of state trespass laws to exclude speakers at the
behest of shopping center managers. This approach would by no means open truly private
property-free-standing stores, apartment complexes or the like-to speech uses. Shopping
centers are clearly distinguishable from most other forms of private property, on the merits,
by virtue of the large and diverse audiences that they attract, and also because shopping
center speech activities, if reasonably regulated, will cause little if any harm to the owners'
proprietary interests.
104 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
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tive convenience. In the long run, however, it should enhance the
process by making the political system more representative and
responsive. What is more, there is no danger, as there was in Da-
vis, that an impact-oriented forum approach would spill over to
invalidate a wide range of other laws. Once the political system
becomes more representative and responsive, perhaps we could
rely upon it more confidently to rectify unintended racial imbal-
ances on civil service tests or in the administration of criminal
justice.
Second, broader forum access accords conceptually with Davis'
requirement of strict neutrality. Unlike judicial invalidation of
racially skewed examination results, or judicially imposed subsis-
tence rights, such access would in theory be available to all, re-
gardless of race or economic status. To be sure, not all speakers
would seek access. For instance, I do not see Ted Turner, Rupert
Murdoch or Donald Trump handing out leaflets in bus terminals,
welfare office waiting rooms, or shopping centers. These people
have what Kalven called "more genteel means" of communicating
to the public. As a practical matter, therefore, most speakers who
avail themselves of the broader access would be members of racial,
political or economic minorities. But this would constitute what
Davis itself would call a constitutionally irrelevant disparate im-
pact-and for once, ironically, the disparity would favor the "have-
nots" rather than the "haves."
VI. THE STATUS OF DA vWS TODAY
As an equal protection doctrine, Davis remains entrenched. In
Hernandez v. New York,' °5 for instance, six of the nine Justices
sustained a prosecutor's authority to use peremptory strikes
against Spanish-speaking jurors.' °6 The prosecutor did so because
he feared that these jurors might not accept the official translation
of the testimony of Spanish-speaking witnesses.'0 7 According to
the six, though the strikes had a disproportionate impact on His-
panic jurors, they were not aimed at Hispanics as such, but rather
at individuals who were fluent in Spanish whether they were His-
panic or not.10 8 Hence, the prosector's action was allowable.
105 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
106 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 372.
107 Id. at 360.
108 Id. at 361.
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Officially, Davis' spirit continues to infuse First Amendment fo-
rum-analysis as well. In its two most recent public forum deci-
sions-Rosenberger v. University of Virginia10 9 and Capitol
Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette"10-the Court hewed to the
categorical approach that it established in Perry by focusing, both
times, on whether the property where the expression occurred was
a "traditional" or at least a "designated" public forum. Capitol
Square, moreover, ignored the manifest likelihood that the expres-
sion which the decision protected would be overwhelmingly reli-
gious. By sweeping aside any Establishment Clause objections to
the expression, the Court displayed its traditional indifference to
non-purposeful disparate consequences.' 1
In the First Amendment area, however, there are harbingers of
change. In Rosenberger and Capitol Square, none of the parties
had any occasion to challenge Perry's ascendancy. The last such
challenge occurred in International Soc'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, Inc. v. Lee,' 2 where Perry barely survived. Former Associ-
ate Justice Byron R. White joined the Court's 5-to-4 opinion in
that case. Since then, he has left the Court, and Associate Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has replaced him. Should a future chal-
lenge materialize, her vote could topple Perry's fragile majority. 1 3
In addition, though Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has
thus far accepted the Perry analysis1 4 she has also demonstrated
a growing sensitivity to the impact of private sector wealth dispar-
109 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995) (holding that public university which subsidizes wide range of
student organizations, including publications, may not withhold funds from otherwise-
qualified student publication merely because publication is religious).
110 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995). Capitol Square held that if a traditional public forum allows
the display of privately-sponsored unattended non-religious symbols, such as craft booths
or United Way thermometers, it must also accommodate privately-sponsored unattended
symbols that have a religious content. Id. at 2458.
111 See Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (S.D.
Ohio 1993). It was clear, from the record in numerous lower court decisions, that when a
government forum accommodates privately-sponsored unattended expressive symbols, the
vast majority of such symbols will be religious ones. Id.; Chabad-Lubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d
1383, 1392 (11th Cir. 1993) (documenting how Rotunda had been used by religious organi-
zations); Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1992) (listing various religious groups
that had used public park as forum); Smith v. Albemarle County, 895 F.2d 953, 955 (4th
Cir.) (holding presence of creche on front lawn of county office building violated Establish-
ment Clause), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 823 (1990).
112 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705
(1992).
113 The appointment of Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer to replace retired Associate
Justice Harry A. Blackmun is unlikely, in my view, to alter the balance further.
114 Indeed she wrote the prevailing opinions in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985), and United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
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ities on the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms. For
instance, her separate and ultimately dispositive concurring opin-
ion in Lee applied an unusually rigorous version of rational basis
review to content-neutral speech regulations in a non-public fo-
rum. As a result, one of the regulations, a ban on leafletting in-
side airport terminals, was invalidated. And in Turner Broadcast-
ing System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n,1 15 she
acknowledged, in another separate opinion, that private sector
power concentrations can pose a significant threat to First
Amendment liberties. 1 16 These developments suggest that Perry,
and its accompanying obliviousness to unintended disparate im-
pacts, may now be vulnerable to attack.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Warren Court, for the most part, got its First Amendment
cases right. The Burger-Rehnquist Court erred by taking Davis-
a sensible enough equal protection decision-and applying its
teachings to speech, where they have no proper business. As a
result, poorer Americans have scant opportunity either to attain
power themselves, or to influence those who presently wield it. I
hope that some future Court will set matters straight. 1 7
115 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2480 (1994).
116 Id. Justice O'Connor qualified this acknowledgment by emphasizing, nonetheless,
that the First Amendment's principal thrust is to curtail governmental rather than private
power. In the very same sentence, though, she said (I think significantly) that this is only
true of 'the First Amendment as we understand it today." Id. (emphasis added).
117 My own state of Connecticut has at least made a start at setting matters straight.
Using its state constitution, it repudiated the Perry line of cases and revived the older
incompatibility test first enunciated in Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
State v. Linares, 655 A.2d 737, 755 (Conn. 1995). 1 submitted an amicus curiae brief on
behalf of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union in Linares, urging the Court to substitute
Grayned's test for Perry's.
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